True, it is insurance spread vide Re & Mutuals that bear burden ‘all-risks’ -knowns, unknowns, knowables & unknowables – very little borne by owner-entrepreneur-firms with deductibles as typical risk of marine adventures. As all costs are passed on, and it is consumers who pay-bear. In such context their concerns need be addressed as to what is history, practices and fore-sight through risk-assessment that are provided for. Aren’t near-misses preached often to be learned from!!

True all are wiser from their own and others’ mistakes-failures, with TITANIC with as milestone. True too, that Murphy is reverently bowed down for `whatever can go wrong, will’ omen, praying for good luck with champagne bottle on naming, breaking coconuts praying to Lord Ganesh obstacle remover. But that shouldn’t absolve professional bodies shouldering well compensated responsibilities for ensuring ships are designed, built, equipped, manned and maintained with IMO Conventions etc, offshore sector going farther -though operating nearer- on safety practices and commitments, with much more at stake, BP having lost market value and trust with US offshore drilling for CEO’s utterances, paying out 65B$ for DEEPWATER Horizon disaster.

Worth recall of accidents with historicity, lest we forget to learn-improve on continuous basis. Leaving aside fiascos on switching from wood to steel, and riveting to welding, post-WW rush was incidental. Brittle steel in cold weather was early culprit. TORREY CANYON grounding and spill could have been a game changer for single hull designs, but it wasn’t? Why, fails the question. Pollution compensation systems followed with from owners and oil interests: CLC & FUND.

Explosions on VLCCs MARPESSA, MACTRA… were steep learning curves, ’73 MARPOL in force only in ’82 with ’78 Protocol, due to disasters-revisions of ‘70s. Weren’t it Oil Majors that researched-introduced IG&COW?DERBYSHIRE was another, OBO explosions: BERGE ISTRA, VANGA.., and loss were bad enough to discontinue them; bad was STELLAR DAISY loss due to flooding-structural failure of huge ballast tanks. 

What was furore against Yanks when Double Hull was mandated and OPA dictating trading terms with local Spill Response Contract requirement? Shouldn’t these have followed TORREY CANYON or was it that architects, designers, builders and Class were still floating on mid-deck tank & Buoyancy! Well they lost having to kowtow; Ballast Water Convention following in the wake!

CAPE SIZE and Bulkers were tragic mishaps questioning integrity of design; UR at last! If shell platings detaching- falling off were not enough, from handy bulkers up buoyancy at bow had to be increased to ensure quicker re-emergence after pitching deep, to avoid hatch covers caving in on overloading with blue seas. (Pardon for `not so pun’ not intented: Blue economy is to be driven by shipping, while Green-er shipping is to reduce pollutants.)

There are few and much more: ergonometric for one: are systems/operational controls designed for lefties? Or lefties should be banned from seafaring operator levels/cadres? Are anchors good enough as ship sizes get heavier, not only to hold but to be used as `speed-breaker’ in emergency?

Yes lifeboats were upgraded to free fall but are they all fireproof? Is accommodation good enough for overworked seamen with fatigue to rest, after ‘downsizing’ by cheap yards? 

Now that AI is being touted as `at horizon’, would all and new risks be factored in to ensure their proper handling to mitigate as far as possible in emergencies? As AI itself is human created by programming facilitating logical decision makings, wouldn’t decisions that would have been made by experience, expertise a la ‘intuitions’ and guess works, be forsaken? 

Wouldn’t insurers that are bound to carry higher quantum of risks be wanting to be involved in all aspects to ensure avoidance of shortcomings from design onwards? As IMO’s roles are limited, how do and can Flag States improve risk avoidance and management? Too late to find and recall/rectify vide Flag State Inspections and Port State Controls! Takes us back to RO and 263 year old Class -that evolved to serve insurance- whose ideals have been questioned in preceding paras!

In worsening weather: wave heights, frequency, freak waves, swell etc, boxes falling off increasing, can’t newer provisions be made to reduce risks, as also in design using newer data records, using AI as need be, including for dynamic ship handling, avoiding parametric rolling etc?

As learned from MAERSK HONAM disaster, what’s being done to improve on design, venting, IMDG Code (that had incorrect listing) etc and on VGM-weight declaration and NKK-MOL sub-judice MOL COMFORT break up, as intermodal logistics hauls cargoes ashore from ships all over the world?! Vicarious liabilities?!

Is the industry taking lead on CII or moaning-groaning on what is being imposed, of necessity. If not H&M that is commoditised with reinsurance, would P&I lead in instigating preventive measures? Food for thought and homework for shipping fraternity. It may be opined that, contrarian maverick thinkers from bottom level upwards -Naval Archs to start with- seem prescriptive, as all seadogs and shore honchos could be conventional wisdom clouded.

-Marex Media